Search and Seizure Protections
in the Fourth Amendment.
 "Our modern Fourth Amendment was based on similar provisions in
several states’ constitutions (fn 40), but its philosophical roots at least go back
to underpinnings that began in the English common law tradition. Seminal in this doctrinal evolution was Semayne’s Case,
(fn 41) where Sir Edward
Coke articulated the now-venerated castle doctrine: “[T]he house of every one [sic] is to him as his . . . castle and fortress.” (fn 42) This historical
impetus led to the eventual adoption of the Fourth Amendment, enshrining the constitutional sanctity of one’s home and possessions.(fn 43)
"The jurisprudential expedition to refine and delineate the contours of
this right has been a protracted one, marked by sporadic expansion and
enhancement.
In landmark, early twentieth-century cases such as Weeks v. United
States, (fn 44) the U.S. Supreme Court introduced the exclusionary rule, barring unlawfully seized evidence from federal court proceedings. (fn 45) This
principle was subsequently applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,
(fn 46)
thereby fortifying the foundational precept that lawful searches and seizures (including lawfully obtained warrants)
were an important
part of investigatory criminal procedure.
"Subsequently, with Katz v.
United States,
(fn 47) later modified by United States v. Jones,
(fn 48) the Court
decidedly shifted the paradigm to “protect people, not places,” (fn 49) emphasizing a “reasonable expectation of privacy” that individuals have in
their activities and property. (fn 50) These privacy protections are further
enhanced by the exclusionary rule, which requires that “fruits” of invalid
searches and seizures (including invalid warrants) are excluded from
court proceedings. (fn 51) The more modern evolution of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, particularly in the context of the search and seizure process, has seen the introduction and solidification of various exceptions
to the warrant requirement. (fn 52) These exceptions, derived from Supreme
Court rulings over the last forty years, point toward an erosion of the
warrant paradigm that historically served as a bulwark against unreaonable intrusions by the state.
"An early harbinger of this change can be seen in Terry v. Ohio,
(fn 53) which marked the boundaries of reasonable searches by finding that
“stop and frisk” procedures were constitutionally viable. (fn 54) Smith v. Maryland (fn 55) then formalized the move toward a weaker Fourth Amendment when the Court carved a substantial exception with its third-party doctrine, mitigating the warrant requirement in cases where individuals willingly ceded information to third parties. (fn 56) Third parties are even
more relevant today than when Smith was decided almost a half-century ago, as individuals have become more dependent upon providers in their use of email, cell phone, social media, and cloud services. (fn 57)
"Quickly following Smith, the plain view doctrine, adopted by a plurality
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Texas v. Brown, (fn 58) allowed officers to seize
(and later use in adjudication) evidence that was “in plain view,” even
in the absence of a warrant-authorized search.(fn 59) Similarly, the goodfaith exception allows evidence obtained by law enforcement officers with a search warrant that is later found to be invalid to be used in
court if the officers acted in good faith and relied on the warrant in good faith.(fn 60)
"Legal scholars have extensively critiqued this trend, deploying arange of academic perspectives that question both the legality and effectiveness of warrant exceptions.(fn 61) Less frequently discussed, however,is the converse relationship between diminishing legal protections against intrusive warrants and the importance of the initial (often brief)
process that determines whether the warrants sought by law enforcement are constitutionally viable. As exceptions to the warrant requirement expand, the need for a legitimate warrant-approval process increases as a safeguard of the privacy of individuals and groups.
"One example where this relationship is particularly noteworthy is the good faith exception.(fn 62) Because officers are given greater leeway under this exception,(fn 63) there is a heightened need for approved warrants to be legally valid through the judicial warrant review process. The heightened need for quality warrant review is also underscored by the uptick in no-knock warrants in recent decades and in the wake of the police killings of those like Breonna Taylor and Amir Locke, where the validity of warrants was called into question.(fn 64)."
Attribution: 138 Harv L Rev 1959 at 1969 (2025)
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